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ABSTRACT
The goal of this research was to examine the effect of managerial ownership and risk toward company performance 
with company environment as the moderating variables and the firm-size as the control variable. The hierarchical 
cluster analysis was used to acquire two group samples of prospector and defender company. The result of multiple 
regression analysis shows that company environment moderates the risk and the managerial ownership toward the 
performance. Polynomial regression analysis method was conducted to test the effect of managerial ownership 
and risk toward the performance in the company with the type of prospector and defender. The result shows that 
in the prospector company, managerial ownership statistically does not give significant influence to company 
performance, and in the second degree, managerial ownership does not affect the company performance. This 
research also proves that managerial ownership negatively affects company performance in the defender company, 
although this influence gradually changes into the positive influence. This research reveals that risk gives positive 
influence to company performance in the defender company. Moreover, this influence gradually changes into 
negative influence. On the other hand, the risk gives negative influence to the performance of prospector company, 
and it gradually changes into the positive influence.
Keywords: environmental dynamism, managerial ownership, risk, performance, defender companies, prospector 
companies
INTRODUCTION
In general, the goal of owner and company 
management is performance achievement which is 
measured by company profitability. In addition, the 
purpose of performance achievement is the prosperity 
level which can be accepted by every party. According 
to the agency theory, there is a separated function 
between the owner (principal) and the manager 
(agent). The result of this separation raises conflict of 
interest for each party trying to change the acquisition 
or acquired company welfare for themselves thus the 
achievement of the company related to the main goal 
cannot be optimal. The previous study proved that 
there were several mechanisms to reduce the agency 
problems, one of which is the managerial ownership 
mechanism and debt policy (Agrawal & Knoeber, 
1996).
Direct management by the owner to company 
operations can enhance company value. The purpose 
of this management is to minimize conflicts of interest 
and to create optimal value. It is worth to know that 
when an owner takes responsibility as manager for a 
long time, he/she has a long-term perspective which 
is more conducive to make valuable decisions for the 
company (Astuti et al., 2015). Other experts state that 
increased managerial ownership helps to connect the 
internal party interests and shareholders to make better 
decisions and to increase corporate value. Thus the 
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entire company activities can be monitored through a 
great managerial ownership.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) stated that the 
increase in managerial ownership could be used as a 
way to reduce agency conflict. It is because it can align 
the interests of management with external shareholders 
thus the company goal can be achieved. Previous 
research by Short and Keasey (1999) concluded that 
ownership by directors significantly gave an effect 
to company performance positively. Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) in Jahmani and Ansari (2006) 
explained that company performance always depends 
on the ownership structure. The other experts, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1986) argued that the parties which had a 
large proportion of share ownership had the capability 
to monitor and control the activities of managerial 
companies. In addition, it was expected to improve 
company performance.
Mehran (1992) conducted research to examine 
the relationship between the capital structure 
with executive incentive plans, managerial equity 
investment, and monitoring by the board of directors, 
and its largest shareholder. The research revealed that 
the company was largely owned by manager tending 
to have a high leverage ratio or investing using high 
debt. According to the theory of capital structure this 
company indicates the high value or good performance. 
In the research claimed that the increase of managerial 
ownership give positive influence to the company 
value that it could create an effective activity. Thus 
it could maximize the company’s decision. There was 
also research that stated managerial ownership had a 
positive impact on the corporate value. On the other 
hand, Siallagan and Machfoedz (2006) stated that 
managerial ownership negatively affected the value of 
the company as measured by Tobin’s Q.
Chilin and Liao (2007) provided inconsistent 
research result. They said that there was no relationship 
between managerial ownership and company value. 
They explained that managerial ownership did not 
directly affect company value. Juhandi et al. (2013) 
supported him that managerial ownership had no effect 
on the dividend policy and the value of manufacturing 
companies in Indonesia Stock Exchange. Jahmani 
and Ansari (2006) had examined the mechanism of 
managerial ownership, risk-taking and corporate 
performance. Their research was concluded that there 
was no significant relationship between variables in 
the entire sample which were companies in the United 
States. Another study by Hastuti (2005) also found 
that there was no relationship between corporate 
ownership and corporate performance.
The funding policy has to be a major concern 
in management to finance a worthy investment to 
achieve maximum performance. Funding through 
debt or capital markets will result in the cost of funds. 
Thus, it is required to have the careful consideration 
to decide what types of funding that will be used. It is 
because the policy will directly impact the corporate 
goal. Based on the agency theory, the concept of labor 
relationship to solve the conflict between owners and 
managers is called debt creation (Jensen, 1989). Debt 
is seen as the symbol of company management which 
is used to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness to 
generate cash flow in the future. On the other hand, 
debt can also be seen as equipment which controls 
opportunistic behavior that reduces cash flow for 
spending discretionary. However, debt increase 
at some point showing accretion risks that will be 
undergone by the company. Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996) conducted a study to examine a mechanism 
that control agency problems to improve company 
performance. The research proved that debt policy 
was significantly related to company’s performance. 
Taswan (2003) conducted a test to probe the effect 
of insider ownership, debt policy and dividend 
toward company value and some others influential 
factors. The finding showed that debt policy had the 
positive effect on firm value. Same line with them, 
HT and Miftahurrohman (2014) conducted a test used 
structural equation modeling toward companies which 
were listed on the Stock Exchange Company. Their 
result revealed that the debt policy had the positive 
effect on firm value.
However, Soliha and Taswan (2002), and 
Sofyaningsih and Hardiningsih (2011) had the 
different view regarding the previous study. Their 
research explained that debt policy had no significant 
effect on company value.
Research about the impact of risk and 
managerial ownership oncompany performance still 
show different and inconclusive results. It has been the 
questionable debate that there must be another factor 
that moderates the effect of managerial ownership 
and risk on company performance. Syafruddin (2006) 
concluded that ownership was not the only factor 
which influenced the performance. The other factors 
could be uncertain environmental conditions and 
ownership by internal parties. Another finding by 
Simerly and Li (2000) said that funding decisions 
gave impact on company performance achievement. 
However, it can be said that funding decisions have 
to consider environmental dynamism. There are some 
different result between companies which have certain 
and uncertain environmental in using debt or equity 
market. This statement is supported by Setyawan 
(2006).
Simerly and Li (2000) stated that uncertainty 
condition is a significant determinant between the 
management of company capital structure and the 
performance. The company which operates in the stable 
environment is required to use funding through debt 
rather than equity. The reason is debt financing costs 
will be lower. Thus debt holders can have the ability to 
monitor the competitive movement by top managers 
and to control the agency cost. On the contrary, when 
the company operates in unstable condition, funding 
through equity should be used to reduce the increased 
transaction costs for the increased risk. Company ability 
to adapt the changing environment, such as a market 
challenge or governance changing the structure, is the 
ultimate answer to generate organization efficiencies 
263The Moderating Effect..... (Levana Dhia Prawati; Martinus Hanung Setyawan)
to achieve company performance (Williamson, 1996).
Miles and Snow (1978) described four types 
of strategy to face the environment. They were 
the defender, analyzer, prospector, and the reactor. 
Different typology is based on the stability of the 
demand for goods and services, quantity and pressure 
of competitor, and technological innovation, and 
predictable development of new products. Another 
expert like Veliyath et al., (1994) conducted research 
by dividing the company into three groups to show 
instability level of the environment which is dealt with 
the company. The groups were the prospector, defender, 
and analyzer company. The theoretical framework that 
will be shown in Figure 1 investigates the moderate 
impact of environmental dynamism, ownership and 
risk on company performance. The researchers use 
size as the control variable in the regression model.
Figure 1 Theoretical Framework
(Source: Authors)
The problem formulations of this research are 
whether the different environment moderates the 
managerial ownership and risk level to company 
performance and whether in the different environment, 
managerial ownership and risk give different impact 
to company performance.
METHODS
This research uses purposive sampling method. 
The samples are manufacturing companies which are 
listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) in 2013-
2014. These companies have information about 
managerial ownership and data of financial calculation 
ratios.
The hypotheses of this research are:
H1: Company environment moderates the effect 
of managerial ownership toward company 
performance.
H2: Company environment moderates the effect 
of risk toward company performance.
H3: In an unstable environment (prospector), 
managerial ownership has the positive 
influence toward company performance, and 
the influence gradually changes to negative 
influence.
H4: In the stable environment (defender), 
managerial ownership has the negative 
influence on company performance, and the 
influence gradually changes into the positive 
influence.
H5: In stable environments (defender), the risk 
level has the positive influence on company 
performance, and the influence gradually 
changes to negative influence.
H6: In an unstable environment (Prospector), the 
risk level has negative influence to company 
performance, and the influence gradually 
changes to positive influence.
 
The first and second hypotheses in this research 
were tested using Multiple Regression Analysis 
(MRA) with pooled data. The equation is as following: 
      (1)
The description is:
ROI = Return on Investment
MO = Managerial Ownership
DER = Debt to Equity Ratio
FIRMSIZE = the natural logarithm of total 
assets of the company
LINGK = the company environment in 
the form of dummy variables. 
Dummy 0 for prospector 
companies, and a dummy one 
for defender companies.
LINGK*MO = the interaction between the 
environment and managerial 
ownership.
LINGK*DER = the interaction between the 
environment and risk.
ε = the error of the regression 
equation.
To test the effect of ownership and risk on 
company performance on both level of environment, the 
researchers use polynomial regression analysis. This 
analysis is used to estimate the effect of independent 
variables on the dependent variable whether it runs 
into different directions. The regression equation for 
both defender company and prospector company are 
as following:
      (2)
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Information:
ROI = Return on Investment
MO = Managerial Ownership
MO2 = The second degree variable of 
managerial ownership which indicates 
the polynomial function
ε = the error of the regression equation
and
      (3)
Information:
ROI = Return on Investment
DER = Debt to Equity Ratio
DER2 = The second degree of DER which 
indicates the polynomial function
ε = the error of the regression equation
Managerial ownership is obtained from the 
percentage of company ownership by the manager 
(Jahmani and Ansari, 2006; Short and Keasey, 1999; 
Fuad, 2005) while the risk is defined as Debt to Equity 
Ratio (Jahmani and Ansari, 2006; Simerly and Li, 
2000; and Setyawan, 2006).
Performance is measured by Return on 
Investment (Simerly and Li, 2006). According to 
Jahmani and Ansari (2006), company performance 
can be measured by two ways. There are accounting 
measure and market-based indicators. This research 
uses the accounting measurement because it shows 
the true state of a company, while the market indicator 
only shows the expecting state.
The moderating variable in this research is the 
corporate environment. This variable is measured by 
using ratios to describe the environment which is dealt 
by company (Veliyath et al., 1994). With these ratios, 
researchers have divided the companies into some 
groups using hierarchical cluster analysis–method 
linkage within groups. There are three ratios used. 
First, total assets ratio measures the efficiency of asset 
usage by the company. Prospector company tends to 
have the lowest ratios and defender company has the 
higher ratio. Second, it is cost of public administration 
and sales/total sales. This ratio measures the efficiency 
of costs incurred by the company to create, develop, 
and introduce the products. Prospector company will 
have the highest ratio while defender company will 
have the lowest ratio. Last, general administration 
costs and sales/ total assets also measure the efficiency 
of costs incurred by the company in use of company 
assets. Prospector company will have the highest ratio 
while defender company will have the lowest ratio.
The previous research conducted by Smith, 
Guthrie and Chen (1989) in Setyawan (2006) proved 
that the size of the company affected the strategic 
relationship and economic performance. Different 
types of company size could cause different influence 
on the regression model. The company size variable is 
calculated from the natural log of total assets.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
The samples were obtained from 38 companies 
with 76 observations. After the researchers analyzed 
these samples using hierarchical cluster analysis 
- within groups linkage method. The results 
show there are 33 observations in the unstable 
environment (Prospector) and 43 observations in 
stable environments (defender). Observations in these 
two groups defines that the prospector companies 
focus on pharmaceutical, cosmetics and house hold, 
and industrial machinery and heavy equipment. 
Meanwhile, the groups of defender companies are 
in textile and garment, consumer goods, ceramics, 
porcelain and glass, and electronics. The researchers 
also find out that some companies are included in both 
prospector and defender company. There are food and 
beverage, automotive and components, house hold 
appliances, cigarettes, chemicals, metals, plastics and 
packaging, and pulp and paper.
After the researchers have analyzed the 76 
companies as ROI variable using descriptive statistical 
analysis, it shows that the mean is 6,422267, and the 
standard deviation is 6,6002649. The result is in the 
range of 0,06 to 43,88. Variable DER with the mean 
(0,1983) and the standard deviation (0,95206) has the 
range of -3,22to 2,08. Variable MO with the mean 
(7,593564) and the standard deviation (13,70298) 
has the range of 0,01 to 73,93. Variable FIRMSIZE 
with the mean (27,9579) and the standard deviation 
(1,75354) has the range of 25,30 to 33,12. Variable 
LINGK*MO with the mean (4,5586) and the standard 
deviation (12,68811) has the range of 0 to 73,93. 
Variable LINGK*DER with the mean (-0,0546) and 
the standard deviation (0,843507) has the range of 
-3,22 to 2,08. These results of Descriptive Statistical 
Analysis are described in Table 1.
Then, the researchers use Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov Z value to conduct the normality test. The 
result of Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) shows 0,311 is above 
the alpha value (0,05). Thus, it can be concluded that 
the all tested data variable are normally distributed. 
Table 2 shows the results of this test.
The value of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
on regression model is used to test the presence 
of multicollinearity. The result can be seen in 
Table 3. It shows that all the VIF variables are under ten 
which means there is no existence of multicollinearity 
(Gujarati and Porter, 2012).
Moreover, autocorrelation testing is conducted 
by using the value of Durbin Watson. The value of 
Durbin Watson on Table 4 shows the value of 1,992. 
In accordance with the Durbin Watson table, the value 
is located in the area between dU – 4-dU, which 
means there is no symptom of autocorrelation in the 
regression testing (Gujarati and Porter, 2012).
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics Test Results
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std Deviation
MO 76 0,0100 73,9300 7,59356 13,702982
ROI 76 0,0600 43,8800 6,42226 6,6002649
LINGK 76 0 1 0,57 0,498
FIRMSIZE 76 25,30 33,12 27,9579 1,75354
LINGK*MO 76 0,00 73,93 4,5586 12,68811
DER 76 -3,22 2,08 -0,1983 0,95206
LINGK*DER 76 -3,22 2,08 -0,0546 0,83507
Valid N (listwise) 76
Table 2 Normality Test Results
One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
Unstandardized 
Residual
N 76
Normal Parameters a.b  Mean 0,0000000
Std.                        
Deviation
5,43209073
Most Extreme Absolute 0,111
Differences Positive 0,111
Negative -0,103
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 0,964
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0,311
a. Test Distribution is Normal
b. Calculated from data
Table 3 Multicollinearity Test Result 
Coefficientsa
Model
Unstandardized Coefficient Standardized Coefficients t Sig.
Collinearity Statistics
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF
1 (Constant) 22,552 11,70 1,927 0,058
MO 0,343 0,102 0,712 3,359 0,001 0,222 4,508
LINGK -3,398 1,705 -0,256 -1,993 0,050 0,602 1,661
LINGK*MO -0,393 0,116 -0,755 -3,393 0,001 0,201 4,974
DER 3,771 1,285 0,544 2,934 0,005 0,290 3,451
LINGK*DER -4,880 1,386 -0,617 -3,521 0,001 0,324 3,088
FIRMSIZE -0,519 0,405 -0,138 -1,280 0,205 0,858 1,165
          a. Dependent Variable: ROI
Table 4 Autocorrelation Test Result 
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate Durbin-Watson
0,568a 0,323 0,263 5,6666765 1,992
 
 a. Predictors: (Constant), FIRMSIZE, LINGK, MO, LINGK*DER, DER, LINGK*MO
 b. Dependent Variable: ROI 
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Heteroscedasticity test is done by looking at 
the scatterplot graph. The Scatterplot graph shows 
the sample data spreads randomly in both above and 
below of the number 0 on the Y axis and does not form 
a specific pattern. It can be concluded in this research 
that there is no heteroscedasticity in the regression 
model as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 Result of the Scatterplot Test
Next, it is the Multiple Regression Analysis 
(MRA) to test the first and second hypothesis. Table 5 
illustrates the result.
Table 5 Multiple Regression Analysis Result 
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate
1 0,568a 0,323 0,263 5,6666765
a. Predictors: (Constant), FIRMSIZE, LINGK, MO, 
LINGK*DER, DER, LINGK*MO
b. Dependent Variable: ROI
Coefficientsa
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficient
Standardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) 22,552 11,70 1,927 0,058
MO 0,343 0,102 0,712 3,359 *0,001
LINGK -3,398 1,705 -0,256 -1,993 ***0,050
LINGK*MO -0,393 0,116 -0,755 -3,393 *0,001
DER 3,771 1,285 0,544 2,934 *0,005
LINGK*DER -4,880 1,386 -0,617 -3,521 *0,001
FIRMSIZE -0,519 0,405 -0,138 -1,280 0,205
        
 a. Dependent Variable: ROI
**Significant at α1%  **Significant at α5%  
*** Significant at α10%
The result of Multiple Regression Analysis 
(MRA) in Table 5 indicates that the variable MO 
has a significant positive influence on ROI that the 
1%, 5%, and 10% of alpha. The DER variable also 
influences ROI positively at 1%, 5% and 10% of alpha. 
Meanwhile, the FIRMSIZE variable does not have the 
significant influence on ROI. The LINGK variable has 
the significant influence on ROI at 10% of alpha.
The LINGK*MO variable influences the 
ROI at 5% and 10% of alpha. It means that 
ENVIRONMENTAL significantly moderates the 
influence of MO to ROI. The first hypothesis is 
proven to be true. It means that the size of managerial 
ownership affects the company performance with 
variations in the specific influence indicated by the 
influence of circumstances and conditions of company 
environment.
The LINGK*DER variable has statistically 
influence on ROI at 1%, 5% and 10% of alpha. It’s 
mean that ENVIRONMENTAL statistically moderates 
the influence of DER to ROI. The second hypothesis 
is statistically proven. It means that critical decision 
such as funding decision, and the environment is 
the essential factor that requires being considered 
by the company. Thus the decision can improve the 
performance.
Polynomial regression analysis is used to test 
the third to sixth hypothesis. The result is in Table 6.
Table 6 The Result of Polynomial Regression 
Analysis on Prospector Company
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of 
the Estimate
1 0,402a 0,162 0,104 8,0823489
 
 a. Predictors: (Constant), MO2, MO 
Coefficientsa
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficient
Standardized 
Coefficients
t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) 6,874 1,889 3,639 0,001
MO -0,024 0,464 -0,029 -0,053 0,958
MO2 0,013 0,017 0,430 0,787 0,438
        
 b. Dependent Varia **Significant at α1%  **Significant at 
α5%  *** Significant at α10%
The value of R Square on Table 7 shows that 
only 10,7% of ROI can be explained by the predictor 
variables, MO and MO2. The researchers find that 
the remaining of 89,3% is influenced by other factors 
in the defender companies indicate that MO has 
statistically negative influence on ROI at 5% and 10% 
of alpha. The variable MO2 has the positive influence 
on ROI at 5% and 10% of alpha. The fourth hypothesis 
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is statistically proven. In defender company, the lower 
amount of stock which is belonged to the manager will 
enhance the company performance, but this condition 
decreasingly moves to the opposite direction like 
declining performance. It is because the boards of 
directors who are the owner of defender company 
have wide chance to improve in managing and making 
the investment decision without personal interest.
Table 8 The Result of Polynomial Regression 
Analysis on Defender Company
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square
Std. Error 
of the Estimate
1 0,948a 0,898 0,893 0,5507740
 
a. Predictors: (Constant), DER2, DER
The value of R Square on Table 8 shows that 
the 89.8% of ROI can be analyzed by the predictor 
variables, DER and DER2. While, 10,2% of the 
remaining valueis influenced by other factors. In 
the defender companies, it shows that the DER has 
influenced the ROI positively at 1%, 5% and 10% of 
alpha. The DER2 variable has statistically negative 
influence on ROI at 1%, 5% and 10% of alpha. Thus, 
the fifth hyphotesis is statistically proven. The use of 
funding through debt in defender company is more 
efficient to improve company performance. It means 
that monitoring and controlling manager decisions 
by debt holder have proven to be effective. Defender 
company tends to be easily predicted, consistent with 
sales, costs and have easily assessed sales trends. It 
creates an effective monitoring by debt holder to 
achieve maximum performance. On the other hand, 
funding through debt does not always produce the 
good performance. If the funding is just through debt 
and increases the debt continuously, the performance 
will decline. This condition indicates that the company 
has financial difficulties or aggressive investments, 
and ignore performance.
Table 9 The Result of Polynomial Regression 
Analysis on Prospector Company
Model Summaryb
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square
Std. Error 
of the Estimate
1 0,629a 0,395 0,354 6,8649512
a. Predictors: (Constant), DER2, DER
Coefficientsa
Model
Unstandardized 
Coefficient
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) 18,458 2,580 7,153 0,000
DER2 -35,183 8,775 -1,740 -4,009 *0,000
DER 20,729 6,447 1,395 3,215 *0,003
b. Dependent Variable: ROI
The value of R Square on Table 9 shows that 
only 39,5% of ROI can be seen by the predictor 
variables, DER and DER2. While the remaining value 
which is 60,5% is influenced by other factors. In the 
prospector companies, DER has the negative influence 
on ROI at 1%, 5% and 10% of alpha. While the DER2 
variable influence the ROI positively at 1%, 5% and 
10% of alpha. The sixth hypothesis is statistically 
proven. The use of high-level debt in prospector 
company will causes strict monitoring by the debt 
holder, so the funding through the capital markets 
will increase company performance. However, this 
research also finds out that prospector company does 
not always use capital markets for funding to improve 
the performance. The evidence indicates that at some 
point company will need quick funding through debt 
that can increase the performance.
CONCLUSIONS
This research finds out  that the environmental 
dynamism moderates the effect of managerial 
ownership and risk toward company performance. The 
firm size does not affect the company performance 
in the regression model. The level of managerial 
ownership and the second-degree have no significant 
impact on the company performance in prospector 
company. While in defender company, the level of 
managerial ownership has the negative impact on the 
company performance but the impact gradually moves 
to positive impact.
The another finding is that risk has the positive 
impact on company performance but the impact 
gradually moves to the negative impact in defender 
company. Moreover, in prospector company, risk 
impact the company performance negatively but the 
impact gradually moves to the positive area. The 
further researches related to these issues may consider 
the confounding effect of industry and the using of 
another environmental dynamism proxy.
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